Research

(Published version; working paper available on SSRN; press release; the final version differs substantially from the previous working paper “The Effect of Unfair Chances and Gender Discrimination on Labor Supply”; replication package; part of my FRQSC grant)

We conduct experiments on an online platform to investigate the causal effect of gender discrimination on labor supply decisions. Controlling for the piece-rate wage, workers who face explicit negative gender-discriminatory wage inequality supply substantially less labor compared to workers who face gender-neutral wage inequality. We also examine the effect of positive discrimination, differences between men and women, and the impact of implicit rather than explicit discrimination. We identify decreased work morale as the underlying mechanism. In addition, we provide survey evidence showing that discrimination in the field reduces work morale and labor supply, corroborating our experimental results.

(Open access in JEBO; replication package; part of my FRQSC grant)

This article investigates whether identifying redistribution recipients of the same or another ethnicity through short interactions affects redistribution. In a laboratory experiment, highly-paid participants (“the rich”) are exogenously assigned to interact with poorly-paid participants (“the poor”) of different ethnicities or with other highly-paid participants. Participants then propose redistribution schemes affecting a larger group. I report that identifying the poor increases redistribution—regardless of ethnic differences. Moreover, I examine the avoidance of interactions with the poor and with those of another ethnicity and the effect of identification on participants who avoid such interactions.

(Open access in Economic Inquiry)

We report the results from three experiments embedded in the same overarching design, which extends the Gift Exchange paradigm for the study of worker-employer relationships. We focus on the effect of the length of the delay, between the time at which workers learn their wage and when they choose an effort level, on the relationship between wage and effort. We compare effort choices made within a few hours after workers learn their wage, with those made several weeks afterward. Our two effort choices are single “cold” choices, but the varying delay allows us to identify any dissipation of reciprocal behavior. We find that the strength of the wage-effort relationship decreases over time, and this change appears to be driven by those workers who receive low wages. We extend our study of delays to the wage-effort relationship below self-reported fair wages. Our findings suggest that workers’ inclination to punish stingy employers weakens over time.

(Open access in Scientific Reports)

Unequal financial outcomes often originate from unequal chances. Yet, compared to outcomes, little is known about how individuals perceive unequal distributions of chances. We investigate empirically the role of different sources of unequal chances in shaping inequality perceptions. Importantly, we do so from an ex ante perspective—i.e., before the chances are realized—which has rarely been explored. In an online survey, we asked uninvolved respondents to evaluate ex ante the fairness of unequal allocations of chances. We varied the source of inequality of chances, using a comprehensive range of factors which resemble several real world situations. Respondents also evaluated how much control individuals hold over the distribution of chances. Results show that different sources generate different ex ante perception of fairness. That is, unequal chances based on socioeconomic and biological factors, such as gender, family income and ethnicity, are evaluated to be unfair relative to the same chances based on effort, knowledge, and benevolence. Results also show that, for most individuals, there is a positive correlation between perceived control of a factor and fairness of unequal chances based on that factor. Luck appears to be an exception to this correlation, ranking as high in fairness as effort, knowledge, and benevolence, but similarly low in individual control as ethnicity, family income, and gender.

(Working paper available on SSRN; part of my MSCA EcoDisc grant)

We investigate preferences for engaging in or opposing discrimination, focusing on moral preferences beyond self-interest. Some individuals may oppose statistical discrimination on grounds of protected-group equality, while others may prefer it to reward groups with higher average merit. Likewise, individuals may oppose taste discrimination or assert their tastes for groups. We conduct incentivized online experiments to elicit discrimination preferences in three domains: ethnicity, gender, and LGBTQ+ status. Analyzing over 60,000 anonymous decisions about how to pay workers, we report highly heterogeneous preferences and a paradox of meritocracy—while merit may be a reason to reject discrimination, it also justifies discrimination.

(Working paper available on SSRN; part of my FRQSC grant)

We conduct an online experiment to study how the unfairness of chances leading to wage inequality affects workers' labor supply decisions. In line with existing research, we find that, at a given wage, disadvantageous wage inequality reduces labor supply. However, surprisingly, whether this inequality stems from fair or unfair chances does not matter. That is, a procedure with fair chances does not compensate for wage inequality. Our results in a work setting stand in stark contrast to prior empirical evidence showing that individuals care about fair chances when making redistribution decisions.

(Data collection for additional experiment upcoming; part of my FRQSC grant)

(Data collected; part of an AUFF NOVA grant)

(Data collected)

(Data collection ongoing)

(Available on SSRN)

[Important note: During a revision at the International Economic Review, we conducted a new experiment similar to the one in this paper, except that (i) it took place over two weeks online instead of over 90 minutes in the lab and (ii) it employed a between subject design instead of a within subject design. The new experiment shows no effect of decreasing incomes on donations.]

We use a controlled laboratory experiment to study the causal impact of income decreases within a time period on redistribution decisions at the end of that period, in an environment where we keep fixed the sum of incomes over the period. First, we investigate the effect of a negative income trend (intra-personal decrease), which means a decreasing income compared to one’s recent past. Second, we investigate the effect of a negative income trend relative to the income trend of another person (inter-personal decrease). If intra-personal or inter-personal decreases create dissatisfaction for an individual, that person may become more selfish to obtain compensation. We formalize both effects in a multi-period model augmenting a standard model of inequality aversion. Overall, conditional on exhibiting sufficiently-strong social preferences, we find that individuals indeed behave more selfishly when they experience decreasing incomes. While many studies examine the effect of income inequality on redistribution decisions, we delve into the history behind one’s income to isolate the effect of income changes.